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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003103

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SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY (ISS) PROGRAM REF: MSG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA/112201Z JUNE 03
SUBJ INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY CONFERENCE (ISS)
WRAP-UP

REF: MSG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA/08 JULY 03 SUBJ IMPACT FROM

LACK OF FUNDS ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY STRATEGY (ISS) PROGRAM

11. SUMMARY: THE EMBASSY COUNTRY TEAM RECENTLY COMPLETED ALMOST A YEAR AND A HALF OF WORK IN ARAUCA DEPARTMENT. IN THAT TIME THE US HAS TRAINED ALMOST A BATTALION AND A HALF OF COUNTERGUERRILLA SOLDIERS, CONDUCTED NUMEROUS MEDICAL ASSISTANCE VISITS, AND ESTABLISHED A COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER. HOWEVER, TRAINING FOR GROUND FORCES WILL END IN DECEMBER 2004, AS THE FUNDS WILL BE COMPLETELY EXPENDED. THE HELICOPTER PACKAGE DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT THE GROUND COMPONENT TO ESTABLISH AN AIR-GROUND QUICK REACTION FORCE WILL NOT FULLY ARRIVE UNTIL MARCH 2005. THIS WILL LEAVE THE PROGRAM HALF WAY TOWARDS ITS INTENDED GOAL. THE COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT THIS PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXTENDED FOR A YEAR AT A MINIMUM TO ALLOW EFFECTIVE AIR GROUND INTEGRATION TRAINING AND AT A MAXIMUM FOR THREE YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH THE LONGER TERM GOAL OF SECURING THE ENTIRE PIPELINE AND SURROUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE. //END SUMMARY.

12. DISCUSSION: IN RESPONSE TO 170 ATTACKS ON THE CANO LIMON OIL PIPELINE THAT SHUT DOWN THE PIPELINE FOR 247 DAYS IN 2001, THE US AND COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS HELD SEVERAL BILATERAL CONFERENCES TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND DEVELOP A LONG TERM RESPONSE TO THESE TERRORIST CHALLENGES (THIS PIPELINE CURRENTLY PRODUCES APPROXIMATELY 97,000 BARRELS A DAY, EARNING AN ESTIMATED ONE BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR OF WHICH THE COLOMBIAN ECONOMY RECEIVES ROUGHLY 85 PERCENT). AS A RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS, THE US CONGRESS ALLOCATED USD 99 MILLION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN ARAUCA DEPARTMENT. THE COUNTRY TEAM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT, USED THE APPORTIONED FUNDS TO PURCHASE A HELICOPTER PACKAGE AND INITIATE A PLANNING ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROGRAM IN NOVEMBER 2002. THE INTENT OF US SUPPORT IS TO ENABLE COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES TO TAKE A MORE PROACTIVE APPROACH TO SECURING THE PIPELINE AND OTHER VITAL INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS CONCEPT PLACES HEAVY EMPHASIS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OPERATIONALIZING THAT INTELLIGENCE INTO ACTIONABLE PLANS, AND RESPONDING WITH QUICK REACTION FORCES.

13. TO DATE THE ISS PROGRAM HAS SUCCEEDED IN TRAINING OVER SIX COMPANIES CAPABLE OF RAPIDLY RESPONDING TO INTELLIGENCE, EXECUTING EFFECTIVE PATROLLING TECHNIQUES, AND CONDUCTING URBAN OPERATIONS. THESE CAPABILITIES HAVE ALLOWED THE BRIGADE TO GREATLY REDUCE ATTACKS AGAINST THE PIPELINE (DOWN TO 18 AND 32 IN 2002 AND 2003 RESPECTIVELY) WHILE ALSO HELPING RESTORE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE DEPARTMENT. THE PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE ROLE OF THE US SPECIAL FORCES (USSF) PERMITTED THESE HIGHLY SKILLED SOLDIERS TO PROVIDE ADVICE ON HOW TO IMPROVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THIS IS MORE THAN A USMILGP PROGRAM, IT IS A MULTI-AGENCY EFFORT WITH OFFICES FROM NAS, ORA, AND USAID PROVIDING CRUCIAL SUPPORT. THE COLOMBIANS, WITH THE SUPPORT OF US SERVICE MEMBERS, WERE ABLE TO OPERATIONALIZE THE INTELLIGENCE GAINED FROM THE ORA-FUNDED COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER. NAS HAS BEEN HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH THE COLOMBIANS REGARDING INCOMING AIRCRAFT, WHILE USAID ASSISTED WITH THE DELIVERY OF SCHOOL SUPPLIES THAT WERE DONATED TO LOCAL SCHOOLS. THE INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) CAMPAIGN IS ANOTHER SUCCESS STORY AND A STRONG REINFORCING EFFORT TO THE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES. ALREADY THERE HAVE BEEN TWO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE VISITS (OVER 4700 MEDICAL AND DENTAL PATIENTS TREATED), A VETERINARY ASSISTANCE VISIT, REPAIR PROJECTS FOR A MEDICAL CLINIC AND SCHOOLS THAT HAS ENCOURAGED THE LOCAL POPULACE TO LOOK TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT FOR HELP IN PROVIDING BASIC NECESSITIES. A ROBUST PYSOP PROGRAM THAT RELIES ON RADIO, LEAFLETS, AND POSTERS HAS ENCOURAGED THE TOWNSPEOPLE AND CAMPESINOS TO RESIST TERRORIST ACTIONS WITHIN THEIR AREA AND ALSO TAUGHT THEM HOW TO REACT TO A TERRORIST ATTACK. THE IO PROGRAM HAS DECREASED CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH SECURITY OPERATIONS AND IMPROVED HUMINT SOURCES AS THE MESSAGE OF WHO REALLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR NEGATIVELY AFFECTING THE CIVILIANS, STANDARD OF LIVING AND SENSE OF SECURITY HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY TRANSMITTED. THE ISS PROGRAM HAS ALSO HELPED WEAKEN THE NARCOTERRORISTS, STRANGLEHOLD ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

14. THE PROBLEM: THE GROUND ELEMENT OF THE ISS PROGRAM WILL TERMINATE IN DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE EXHAUSTION OF THE ALLOCATED FUNDS, AND THE OVERALL PROGRAM WILL CEASE SHORTLY AFTERWARDS WITH THE MISSION ACCOMPLISHING BUT A SMALL PART OF THE OVERALL VISION.

15. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE ISS PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO FUNCTION AS AN INTEGRATED GROUND AIR OPERATION SUPPORTED BY A PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE TEAM FROM A USSF COMPANY. UNFORTUNATELY, DUE TO CONTRACTUAL DELAYS THE AIR COMPONENT (8 HUEYS AND 2 BLACKHAWKS) WILL NOT FULLY ARRIVE IN COUNTRY UNTIL MARCH 2005 AT THE EARLIEST AND WILL NOT BE READY FOR AIR-GROUND TRAINING UNTIL JUNE 2005. WITH USSF TROOPS SCHEDULED TO DEPART IN DECEMBER 2004 (WITH THE END OF FUNDS FOR GROUND TRAINING), THIS WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE AIR ASSAULT TRAINING BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND UNITS AS THE LEADERS AND MEN OF BOTH COMPONENTS WILL NOT HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING FROM USSF FORCES. WHILE USMILGP-BOGOTA HAS WORKED TO AMELIORATE THIS PROBLEM BY HAVING UNITS IN ARAUCA TRAVEL TO TOLEMAIDA FOR ABBREVIATED AIR ASSAULT TRAINING (WHERE OTHER COLOMBIAN PILOTS ARE UNDERGOING BASIC ROTARY WING TRAINING FOR THE PLAN COLOMBIA HELICOPTERS), THE FACT IS THAT THIS TRAINING DOES NOT ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE BRIGADE, COVERS ONLY THE BASICS, AND IS NOT CONDUCTED WITH THE PILOTS WITH WHOM THEY WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ABSENCE OF USSF TRAINERS WILL ALSO MEAN THE 18TH BRIGADE STAFF (HIGHER HEADQUARTERS IN ARAUCA DEPARTMENT) WILL NOT RECEIVE PLANNING ASSISTANCE FROM US EXPERTS ON HOW TO BEST INTEGRATE THIS NEW MOBILITY CAPABILITY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS. FINALLY, MOST OF THE EQUIPMENT FOR THE GROUND UNITS WILL NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE FALL OF 2004.

16. THE US PRESENCE HAS HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE COLOMBIANS HAVE ADJUSTED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LACK OF HELICOPTERS, HOWEVER, THE NARCOTERRORISTS HAVE COUNTERED THESE EFFORTS BY GOING AFTER ELECTRICAL TOWERS AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS NEW DIRECTION OF ATTACK HAS EXCEEDED THE COLOMBIANS CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON NUMEROUS TOWERS IN THE REGION WITHOUT THE USE OF ROTARY WING ASSETS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE WHERE THE USSF STRUCTURE IS CURRENTLY ASSISTING THE COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF WITH DEVELOPING NEW WAYS TO LESSEN THE IMPACT OF THESE ADDITIONAL ATTACKS--A CAPABILITY NOT AVAILABLE AFTER 31 DECEMBER 2004.

17. AS TO THE LONGER TERM PROBLEM, BOTH THE US AND COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT THAT SPECIFIED THE OBLIGATIONS OF EACH GOVERNMENT. THE US GOVERNMENT HAS DILIGENTLY AND RESPONSIBLY WORKED TOWARDS FULFILLING THESE OBLIGATIONS. TRAINING FOR THE GROUND UNITS IS ON TARGET TO HAVE TRAINED AT LEAST THREE (OUT OF SIX) COUNTERGUERRILLA BATTALIONS OF THE 18TH BRIGADE AND PROVIDED CONTINUAL PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE TO THE 18TH BRIGADE STAFF. THE HELICOPTER PROGRAM IS ON TRACK TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE, HELICOPTERS, PILOT AND CREW TRAINING. HOWEVER THE VISION AS STIPULATED IN THE MOA, SHOULD ADDITIONAL FUNDS BECOME AVAILABLE, IS THAT THE PROGRAM WOULD ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF THE ENTIRE PIPELINE. THE ISS PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AND THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD REINFORCE THIS SUCCESS BY ENSURING THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY DEVELOPS A MATURE AND WELL ROUNDED CAPABILITY TO REACT TO ATTACKS EXECUTED BY NARCOTERRORISTS.

18. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1A. NEAR TERM (PHASE 1): THE ISS PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXTENDED AT LEAST AN ADDITIONAL YEAR, UNTIL THE END OF THE 1ST QUARTER FY06, IN ORDER TO ENABLE GROUND FORCES TO TRAIN WITH THE AIR ASSETS PROVIDED TO THE 18TH BRIGADE BY THE US GOVERNMENT. THIS WILL ENSURE THE COLOMBIANS BECOME PROFICIENT IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT THE PIPELINE PROTECTION INITIATIVE.

(1) THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD EXECUTE THESE SPECIFIC TASKS:

- (A) INTEGRATION OF GROUND AND AIR COMPONENTS
- (B) EXTEND SUPPORT TO NORTE DE SANTANDER DEPARTMENT
- (C) CONTINUE SUPPORT FROM KM 0 TO KM 178, AS THIS IS THE MOST VULNERABLE AREA TO ATTACK BASED ON HISTORICAL AND CURRENT RECORDS.

(2) WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE COST TO EXTEND THE PROGRAM FOR AN ADDITIONAL YEAR (JAN-DEC 05) AND TO TRAIN AND PARTIALLY EQUIP ADDITIONAL UNITS WILL BE:

- (A) \$5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION
- (B) \$1.00M FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
- (C) \$0.50M FOR FP INFRASTRUCTURE

1B. LONG TERM (PHASE 2): IN THE SPIRIT OF THE MOA BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, WHICH IS BASED ON A LONG TERM APPROACH, TO SECURE THIS IMPORTANT INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION INITIATIVE IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS PROGRAM BE FUNDED UNTIL 2007. CONTINUATION OF THIS MISSION WOULD ALSO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE EXTENSION OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING TO THE NORTH ALONG THE PATH OF THE PIPELINE.

(1) THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD EXECUTE THESE SPECIFIC TASKS:
(A) EXTEND SUPPORT AND INTEGRATION OF PIPELINE AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCURE TO THE COAST.
(B) TRAIN AND ASSIST UNITS ALONG THE PIPELINE BASED ON A THOROUGH STUDY OF THE SITUATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE PICTURE OF THE AREA TO INCLUDE THE STANDING MISSIONS OF THE UNITS, TERRAIN, AND ENEMY TACTICS.
(C) CONTINUE SUPPORT FROM KM 0 TO KM 178 OF THE PIPELINE FOR THE REASONS STATED IN PHASE I.

(2) THE ANTICIPATED COST OF THIS PROGRAM WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) JAN-DEC 06:
\$5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION
\$3.00M FOR EQUIPMENT
\$2.00M FOR INFRASTRUCTURE
\$1.50M FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT

(B) JAN-DEC 07:
\$5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION
\$3.00M FOR EQUIPMENT
\$0.50M FOR FP INFRASTRUCTURE
\$1.50M FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT

(C) THE DIFFERENCE IN COSTS BETWEEN 2005 AND YEARS 2006-2007 REFLECTS THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TRAINING ADDITIONAL UNITS AND AT NEW BASES AS THE PROGRAM EXTENDS TO THE NORTH WHEREAS THE 2005 FUNDS ARE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE ONGOING TRAINING (AND INTEGRATION OF THE AIR COMPONENT INTO MILITARY OPERATIONS). THE FORCE PROTECTION MONEY FOR 2005 IS TO INSURE THE BASES IN NORTE DE SANTANDER DEPARTMENT HAVE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR US FORCES PROVIDING PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE FOR ONGOING OPERATIONS, BUT IS NOT INTENDED FOR A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE. THE INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS IN 2006 ARE FOR A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE (AS IN SARAVERA) AND IS FRONTLOADED SO ALL INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS ARE COMPLETE PRIOR TO 2007.

19. YOUR PRIMARY POC AND SPONSOR IS LTC DANIEL GETTINGS, COMMERCIAL TEL (571) 266-1208.
DRUCKER

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